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two parties.' This lack of precedent may be attributed to the fact
that the statutes involved in prior cases did not, in specific terms,
create such an alternative burden. From the court's language, it is
clear that the alternative nature of a tax does not place the obligation
imposed by such a tax upon a bankrupt vendor outside the class of




DIVIDENDS OUT OF SURPLUS OTHER THAN EARNED SUR-
PLUS: LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR PAYMENT
WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE
Section 38 (paragraph d) of the Ohio General Corporation Act
provides:
"Whenever a dividend is paid, in whole or in part, out of
other than earned excess of assets appearing on the books of the
corporation at the time of the declaration of such dividend, the
shareholders receiving such dividend shall be notified as to its
source." I
At common law and under some statutes surplus other than
earned surplus was an available fund out of which to pay dividends. 2
However, as the stockholders did not always realize that part of
their investments was being returned in the form of dividends, they
were often duped into believing that the corporation was operating
profitably and was in excellent financial condition.3  To correct
this condition provisions in the corporation statutes of various
17 The cases do not go beyond the determination of whether a particular exaction is
a debt or a tax in respect to the individual in question, thus disregarding the relationship
of the other one of the two parties affected by the tax. New Jersey v. Anderson, 203
U. S. 483, 27 S. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284 (1906); Matter of Independent Automobile
Foundry Co., 118 F. (2d) 537 (1941); In re Reimer, 82 F. (2d) 162 (1936); It re
General Merchandise Corp. of America, 32 F. Supp. 805 (1940).
'OHIO G. C. No. 8623-38 (paragraph d).
a Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 212 N. Y. 360, 106
N. E. 92 (1914); Mackintosh v. Flint and Pere Marquette Railway Co., 34 Fed. 582
(C. C. E. D. Mich. 1888); Smith v. Cotting, 231 Mass. 42, 120 N. E. 177 (1918); Sec
Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law; American Statutes and Cases, (1929)
29 COL. L. REv. 461; Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Lawu: Surplus and
Profits, (1930) 30 COL. L. Rzv. 330; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 14; Note, (1931) 31 CoL.
L. REv. 844.
'GATES, OHIO CORPORATION MANUAL, sec. 48, 138. TOWNSENv, 01O CORPORATION
MANUAL, see. 138.
NOTES
states, similar to the one above, were enacted.4 Some states have
restricted dividends out of such surplus still further, so that if
there is preference stock, only that stock may be paid dividends out
of such surplus, and then only if notice is given either prior to or
concurrently with such payment.; Still others prohibit such divi-
dends altogether.'
The wording of the requirement that notice be given should be
contrasted with that of a subsequent provision of the same section.
Paragraph e provides:
".... A corporation may... apply any part or all of any paid-in
surplus or any excess of assets however created or arising except-
ing only surplus arising from revaluation of assets, to the reduction
or writing off of any deficit in the account of earned surplus or to
the writing off of any particular loss or expense . . . and thereby
make available for dividends without notice to the shareholders as
to the source of such dividend any earned excess of assets remain-
ing or resulting therefrom or thereafter arising, but in case such
action is taken a disclosure thereof shall be made in the next annual
statement of the corporation.
' '7
As the provision in paragraph e is that notice as to the source
of the dividend need not be given, but that a disclosure must be
made in the next annual statement, it implies that under paragraph
'Louisiana, L. 1928 Act 250, Sc. 26; Virginia, CODE, Sec. 3840.
ICalifornia, DEw":;G's CIVIL CoYs No. 346, 246b; Illinois, SMTN-HuPD REv. STAT.
0l933) Chap. 32, Ste. 157.41; Michigan, 'MeH. STATUTES ANNOTATED, 21.22; Pennsyl-
vwnia, PUr:DoN's STATUTES ANNOTATED (1936) title 15, See. 2852-704.
6Arizona, R. S. 4804 (1928); Missouri, Rrv. ST. (1929) 5107; North Carolina,
Mixcu. (1931) CoDE Sec. 1179, as amended, L. 1933, Chap. 354, Sec. 1; South Carolina,
CVINAI:L CODE No. 1353.
' Paragraph c seems to be intended to fit the case of a corporation that has been oper-
ating and which has an earned surplus, which was subsequently depleted by losses, while
paragraph d seems to apply to a new corporation starting in business and using the paid-in
-urplus as a source of dividends (usually on preference stock) until the corporation
reaches a profitable point. It is not considered sound financial policy, however, to use
paid-in surplus for dividend purposes, even on preference stock, and the better course
i- to retain the surplus as a cushion to absorb possible future losses. See DEWING,
FIN:A:NCIAL PoLIcIEs or Co'r vIOTS (1934) Sec. 584-604; KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
(1941) 19, 6S-73.
If the corporation reduces its capital and thereby creates a surplus it is more than
likely that the availability of such surplus for dividends would be discussed at the time
of the approval of the reduction, and that therefore the stockholders would expect
that such payment would occur, and so there is less reason for not notifying them of
the source of the dividend, althoug!h the use of paid-in surplus in a like manner under
paragraph e seems not much different from the use under paragraph d. The Committee
on Corporation Law of the Ohio State Bar Association expressed doubts as to the need
for continuing either of these provisions for notice. OHIo STATE BAR Assoc.: CosI-
'IITTFE ON CoRror,.TioN LAw REPORT, (1928) p. 52.
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d, where notice shall be given, notice in the annual statement is in-
sufficient, and that shareholders should be notified before or at the
time of receiving the dividend payment. A trial judge has held that
these provisions are merely directory," and it would seem that a div-
idend, legally authorized and out of an available fund, should not
later be considered unlawful because of the failure to give notice
as to its source; at least not to such an extent as would make the
directors paying such a dividend liable under section 123b of the
Ohio Corporation Act.
Especially is this true when we consider the liability of the di-
rectors under section 123 b (Ohio G. C. Sec. 8623-i23b) which
provides:
"The directors of a corporation shall not declare or pay divi-
dends or authorize the withdrawal or distribution of any part of its
assets except as provided by this act...
"In case of any willful or negligent violation of the provisions
of this section, the directors, under whose administration this shall
have happened (except those who shall dissent as hereinafter pro-
vided), shall be jointly and severally liable to 'the corporation for
the full amount of any such unauthorized dividend or distribution
with interest at the rate of six percentum per annum until the same
shall be paid."
Statutes creating a liability on the part of the directors for illegal
payment of dividends have been classed as either provisions for pay-
ment of damages," or as penalties against the directors for their
a See, Scullin v. Mutual Drug Co., 138 Ohio St. 132, 137 (1941). The contention
that the provision for notice is merely directory may well be based on the argument that
because OHIO G. C. Sec. 8623-38 paragraph a, authorizes dividends out of the excew
of the assets over the liabilities and stated capital, that full authority has been granted to
pay dividends out of other than earned surplus, and the requirement of notice in case
of such a payment, coming several paragraphs later, is not a restriction upon the author-
ity granted but merely an instruction.
0 Whether the statutory liability is penal or remedial depends chiefly upon the wording
and construction of the statute. Those making the directors liable for all the debts of the
corporation existing at the time of the wrongful declaration are considered penal while
those making the directors liable to the creditor in the event of insolvency up to the
amount of the illegal dividend are considered remedial. For discussions of the various
types of statutes and the cases under them, see:
13 AMER. JUR. 743;
3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed.) Se. 1209;
12 FLEca, CYcLOPEDIA Or CoaRoP.RATONS (Perm. Ed.) 150;
Annotations: 55 A. L. R. 72 (1928);
76 A. L. R. 892 (1932);
109 A. L. R. 1388 (1937).
NOTES
wrongful acts. Statutes making the directors liable for damages
resulting from illegal payment of dividends run afoul of the difficulty
of determining the damages to the corporation, such as, for example,
estimating the damages resulting from the deprivation of funds that
otherwise might have been used for expansion of the business, etc.
A determination of whether the Ohio statute provides for dama-
ges by saying flatly that the corporation shall be considered as a
matter of law as being damaged to the full amount of the unauthor-
ized dividend with interest, or whether it means that the liability
of the directors created by the statute is a penalty for their un-
authorized acts, seems unnecessary, for it appears from the language
of the statute that the legislature meant that regardless of the
theory, the directors' liability should always be the full amount of
suoh unauthorized dividends. The restrictions of section 8623-I23c
on the creditors' derivative right of action to cases where insol-
vency, general assignment for creditors, receivership, or dissolution
exists would imply that actions in favor of the corporation do not
depend on any of these factors but are intended to restore the corpo-
ration to the position existing before the payment of the unauthor-
ized dividend, or in other words, the directors are liable for the full
amount of the unauthorized dividend with interest.
But are dividends out of surplus other than earned surplus where
notice of the source is not given unauthorized dividends to the
extent that the directors are liable for the full amount of the divi-
dends? It would seem not. Section 8623-I23b creates a liability
in favor of the corporation with the intention to restore the corpora-
tion to its former position. But does failure to give the stock-
holders notice of the source of the dividend, where the dividend is
from a proper source at the time of declaration, deprive the corpora-
tion of any fund illegally or damage it to any extent, when the
corporation would be in the same position financially if notice had
been given the stockholders? The provisions for notice of the
source of dividends seem clearly for the protection of the stock-
holder as a stockholder, while the statutory liability of the directors
is intended to preserve intact the capital of the corporation for the
protection of the creditors and to guard the continued existence of
the corporation for the benefit of all the stockholders. These pro-
visions being for the protection of different interests,0 failure to
give notice under the first provision should not make the directors
LAW JOURNAL - DECEMBER, 1941
liable under the second. If the directors were liable for such pay-
ments, the stockholders would receive the benefit of their liability
by having the surplus available for dividends restored to the former
amount, and thereby have an additional source of funds for future
dividends.
While a dividends out of other than earned surplus without notice
to the stockholders, comes under a literal interpretation of the di-
rectors' liability under sec. 8623 -I2 3 b, yet because of the difference
in interests protected, it would seem that the directors should not be
liable under that section for failure to give notice as provided in
sec. 8625-38 (paragraphs d and e).
F. F. V.
PURCHASE OF OWN SHARES- BY CORPORATION-
FUND AVAILABLE
Proceeding under Ohio G. C. Sec. 8623-14, the defendant cor-
poration, by a two-thirds vote of its shareholders, amended its articles
of incorporation so as to relieve it from the obligation of maintain-
ing a sinking fund for the redemption of preferred shares. Plain-
tiffs, minority shareholders who had voted their shares against the
amendment, took advantage of the "appraisal statute," Sec. 8623-72,
and demanded that the corporation pay them the "full cash value"
for their shares. The corporation refused to pay the price asked,
and made a counter offer. Rejecting this, plaintiffs brought suit
in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County to determine the
fair cash value and secure a judgment against the corporation. The
court suitained a motion to dismiss for failure of proof. Plaintiffs
appealed, and following the Court of Appeals order reversing the
0 It may be argued that the corporation is the stockholders and that therefore the
same interest is being protected by both sections of the act. But the interest of the
stockholders as an aggregate may well be different from the interest of the individual
stockholder. As for example, if dividends out of other than earned surplus are paid to
preferred stockholders, does failure to give notice to the preferred stockholders injure
the common stockholders when if notice were given to the preferred, the common stock-
holders would not have cause to complain even though he was kept in ignorance of the
payment? If the preferred stock has preference on dissolution, the preference is the full
definition of the preferred stock's rights, and precludes the preferred from sharing in
the surplus available after payment of par on the preferred and common. Williams
v. Renshaw,220 App. Div. 39, 220 N. Y. S. 532 (1927); Murphy v. Richardson Dry
Goods Co., 326 Mo. 1, 31 S. W. (2d) 72 (1930). The preferred stockholder therefore
does not have the interest in keeping the capital surplus intact that the common stock-
holders would, and yet in our example the notice if given of the payment out of capital
surplus would be to him. The notice seems therefore not for the protection of the ag-
gregate of the stockholders, but only for the stockholder in his individual capacity.
100
